I’ve reread these several times. I am not a pure Platonist. I do believe in universals, but I don’t think we need to get bogged down in Plato’s specifics. In any case, did Plato believe that relations were universals? I’m not sure, yet take the relation “north of.” This seems to be a universal. That’s Bertrand Russell’s example.
Does Love have an object? Yes. Love has to love something (200c). Unfortunately, this implies desire, which is a lack. Necessarily, then, Love must love beautiful things.
“justified, true belief:” “To have a right opinion without being able to give a reason is neither to understand nor is it ignorance” (202B).
The nature of spiritual: “for all the spiritual is between divine and mortal” 202c-204c. Love is a great spirit which has causal power. God cannot mingle directly with man but goes through the Forms. Beauty is simple and we partake of Beauty only by participation (209c-211c). Language of ascent in 211c.
Thrasymachus: Justice is whatever serves the advantage of the stronger. However, he admits that sometimes the Stronger commands the weaker to do what is not in the stronger’s advantage (e.g., when the Stronger unwittingly makes a mistake). Socrates then asks, “What is ‘advantage?’”
The practitioner of an art/scientia never seeks the advantage simply for the sake of the art (healing is not for the sake of healing, but for the body).
Beginning of a definition of justice: a kind of wisdom or virtue (350C-352A)
Justice belongs to the noblest class, the soul. Justice is a form which has causal power (358b-360c). Socrates is rebutting the counterargument that no one is just willingly, but only under compulsion. In responding, Socrates posits several analogues (369c):
- Man = city
- soul = justice
God, as good, could not be the cause of all things (i.e., he could not be the cause of evil).
God is simple and good, so he is changeless (380a-381d). Things in the best condition are least liable to change. If something undergoes change, then it is being changed by something else (and the lesser doesn’t change the greater).
Educating to virtue, thus censorship. A good soul by its own virtues provides a body in the best possible condition (402d-404c). The better rulers are usually older men (408c).
There is an equivalence between concord–harmony–music–training.
- The result of this concord is a soul that is both temperate and brave (410c. passim).
- Remember that the individual soul is an analogue to the City.
Plato suggests a communism in regard to the training of Guardians, but we are not yet to a full communism in society (415e).
The guardians must guard against all extremes in wealth and poverty, for these lead to idleness (422b). They must maintain the mean between wealth and poverty.
Temperance permeates all of society. It “brings all the strings into concord” (432a).
Moves back to a definition of justice:
- to do one’s business and not meddle in affairs (4323-434c).
- justice is the presupposition (precondition?) of the other Greek virtues: temperance, courage, intelligence.
- multiplicity makes finding justice difficult.
- justice maintains the harmony between classes.
- We can know justice for a city by looking at a man who maintains this harmony in his soul (435a).
Do we learn by one faculty, feel by another, etc.?
- Are the faculties within man simply synonymous or are they distinct?
- They are distinct. There is something in the soul that moves towards Logos and another that moves towards the passions (438b-439e).
- This is similar to Freud’s “divided mind” theory.
Plato ends Book IV with a suggestion of the 5 faculties. However, Book V is a detour
Book V is an intricate discussion on the particulars of a philosophical city. Such a city must be unified. Thus,
“So that city is best managed in which the greatest number say “mine” and ‘not mine’ with the same meaning about the same things” (462a-463d)
This sounds a lot like Augustine’s Discussion in Book IXX City of God.
Opposites and One
Since beautiful and ugly are opposites, they are two. And since they are two, each is one. Even though each of these are one, they appear as many because each shows itself everywhere in community (476a). This sounds like Maximus’s Logos/logoi. Collectively, the forms are one but they manifest themselves as many.
Discussions of Nominalism
Is there beauty in itself, or is beauty just a name? The knower knows something, not nothing. If he knows something, he knows something that is. You can’t know what is not. Further, there is a state between knowledge and ignorance
knowledge = things that are ignorance = things that are not
knowledge is a faculty (Plato calls it a power)
Opinion is between the two; it partakes of both being and non-being. This the realm of Becoming.
The “mob mentality” probably can’t separate “The Beautiful” from beautiful things (493e).
“perfect model of the the Good, the use of which makes all just things” (505a-c).
Arche-writing and Trace
The ideals/forms appeal to the mind (507b). Hearing and sound inferior to seeing because they can work if the third term is absent. The following triad
sigh—> light ←-color
The ectype is in relation to the archetype by analogy (508).
We have noted that the forms have causal power. Their effects are in the mind.
The good is the cause that knowledge exists. The Good is not a state of knowledge but something beyond it.