Download them while you can.
I am not an expert in analytic theology, and I have been critical of analytic philosophy in the past. Nonetheless, it can be useful in clarifying concepts. One problem is that people jump into the deeper waters, reading countless computer symbols and the analytic guys never bother to clarify what’s going on. I’ll try.
McCall, Thomas. Introduction to Analytic Theology. It is what the title says. He introduces some key concepts but doesn’t really get beyond Leibniz’s Law. Still, anything McCall writes is worth getting.
Moreland, JP. Love Your God with all your Mind. What would it look like if you applied analytic reasoning to the development of the soul?
Morris, Thomas V. Our Idea of God. He doesn’t call it analytic theology, but it is an early essay into how it is done. Wonderfully accessible.
Nash, Ronald. The Concept of God. Kind of a simplified version of Plantinga’s Does God have a Nature? Some great responses to open theism.
Clark, Kelly. Return to Reason. This is the unsung volume in apologetics.
McCall, Thomas. Which Trinity? Whose Monotheism? Not primarily analytic theology, per se, but it is a great application of analytic theology.
Crisp and Rea, Analytic Theology: New Essays. Some outstanding essays, some bleh. Sadly, Rea, Wolterstorff, and possibly stump have surrendered the field on sexual ethics.
Craig and Moreland, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview. Somewhat technical, but simply grand.
Moreland and Rae, Body and Soul. Outstanding defense of substance dualism. Moreland writes with Kingdom Power.
Moreland, JP. Kingdom Triangle. Triangulates (sorry) analytic theology with continuationist theology.
Morris, Thomas V. Logic of God Incarnate. Rescues Christology from the contradiction charge. Several very important concepts introduced.
Plantinga and Wolterstorff. Faith and Rationality. Almost as important historically as it is philosophically.
Richards, Jay Wesley. The Untamed God. Introduces modal concepts and show where they advance beyond Aristotle.
Kripke, Saul. Naming and Necessity. Some technical chapters, but a mostly accessible work on language and possible worlds.
Lewis, David. Counterfactuals. Very difficult, but Lewis does walk you through his method, so it is readable.
Plantinga, Alvin. Nature of Necessity. One of the most important philosophy works in the last century. Possible Worlds matter.
———–. Does God Have a Nature? Plantinga got accused of denying simplicity in this book. I never saw where he did so. Great primer on how to do analytic theology.
———–. Warrant and Proper Function. Clears up a lot of (perhaps deliberate) misunderstanding on what Plantinga means by “warrant.
———. Warranted Christian Belief. Application of his previous two books.
Moreland, J. P. and Issler, Klaus. The Lost Virtue of Happiness (Navpress).
Far from being a self-help book, Moreland and Klauss (MK) define happiness in terms of its more ancient setting: a happy life is one that allows me to pursue virtue. In Christian terms, a happy life is a disciplined life that allows me to pursue the Kingdom of God.
Today happiness is defined as “good feeling” (MK 16). If happiness is defined as my good feelings, and if the goal of happiness is to pursue my good feelings, then everything has to center around…me! This creates what sociologists call “the empty self.”
Further, the empty self is what we project outwards to others. MK also have interesting suggestions on how the empty self leads to loneliness–and they posit solitude as the correction to loneliness.
Unlike other spiritual disciplines books, this offers a number of practical suggestions for enabling the “disciplined life.” Of course, the reader won’t accept every suggestion (and in fact, I disagree with a few of them). Nevertheless, most are quite helpful and have further enriched my own prayer life.
Of Particular help:
studying: the mind works from whole to part to whole. Moreland suggests–and this is something I’ve been doing for about a decade–to study the table of contents before you read a difficult book. If it is well-organized, the book won’t be that difficult.
increasing prayer time: It’s hard to kneel down a pray for a good, cold hour. However, Moreland suggests a number of strategies that can enrich and eventually lengthen prayer time. Instead of “dive-bomber prayers,” he urges “pressure cooker prayers.” Instead of saying, “Dear Jesus, please be with Suzy today,” we can keep coming back to the Lord in 2 or 3 minute increments and lifting Suzy up, often bolstered by Psalms, and “wrestling with the Lord in prayer” over Suzy. After a while, we realize we have been often in prayer, even working with God.
Calm down: Moreland has a controversial, yet probably workable suggestion on anxiety. He has noted that neuroscience is seeing that the heart has its own “system.” He recommends breathing techniques that will calm the heart. This is fine as long as we don’t say “thus saith the Lord.”
Deliverance ministries: MK are correct that demons cannot possess believers. Let that be said loud and clear. However, demons can attack and afflict believers. This isn’t that startling a statement. If you are attacking satanic strongholds and winning victories for the kingdom, do you really expect Satan to stand idly by? How will a demon attack you? As Paul says, by letting sinful passions “gain a foothold.”
I recommend it for intermediate believers who already have a strong foundation in the spiritual disciplines.
Moreland, J. P. Love your God with all Your Mind (Navpress).
Many have rightly hailed this book as a game-changer. Unfortunately, not enough have. It’s hard to put this book’s importance into words. It changed my life in college. Enough with the praise; let’s begin.
Moreland’s thesis is developing a Christian mind is part of the essence of Christian discipleship (Moreland 43). Further, since the mind is a faculty of the soul (72, more on that later), one cannot develop one’s soul in relation to God without taking the mind into account. Yet Moreland is not encouraging us to become arcane theology wonks. He places the life of the mind within cultivating a framework of virtue (104-112). Virtue is elsewhere explicated as “the good life,” the life lived in accordance with God’s design (35). A virtuous life is a free life: freedom is the power to do what one ought to do. Finally, a virtuous life is a communal life.
Indeed, for example, it is this communal aspect of the virtuous life that Aristotle sought (170). It is a view of friendship that is formed around a common vision and shared goods (shades of Augustine!). Rather, New Testament fellowship–koinonia–is commitment to, and participation in, advancing the Kingdom from the body of Christ. What relevance, then, to the life of the mind? New Testament fellowship should be guided by the good life as revealed in the gospel, which includes a life of epistemic virtue. We are to build each other up in this.
Theology and Worship: God is a maximally perfect being. He is not just a perfect God, but perfect in all possible worlds. From this Moreland develops his theology of worship. While not Reformed, he anticipates some like an RPW. I disagree with his “testimony” time after the sermon, but mainly because this almost always kills the flow and narrative of worship (have you ever been to the last night of summer camp in youth group? Then you know of what I speak).
Interestingly, Moreland also accepts rule by elders, if not by synod.
Ethics: happiness, following the ancients and utilizing the New Testament, is a life of virtue whic includes suffering (35).
Philosophy and the Soul: we must remember that both ancient man and the Christian tradition defined the mind (as well as the spirit) as a faculty of the soul (Moreland 70-73). While it is a true statement that the soul has contact with God, yet it is the mind that is the vehicle for the soul’s making contact with God. On the other hand, the spirit is the faculty of the soul that relates to God (Romans 8:16 and maybe Eph. 4:23).
Moreland then outlines the five states of the soul (sensation, thought, belief, act of will, and desire). What’s interesting about that is the above states of the soul cannot be reduced to purely physical categories. This means the soul/mind is not reducible to the brain, which means scientific naturalism is false. This is also what R. L. Dabney meant by “connative” powers (I think; see Dabney Discussions II: 240, 243, III: 281; The Sensualistic Philosophy, chs. 1-2).
Not only does the soul have the aforementioned five states, it also has capacities or hierarchies. Without getting too technical, understanding the soul’s capacities is key in the abortion debate.
Moreland further gives some practical lessons in logic and analytical reading. That, too, changed my life. Few things are more beautiful than a well-time modus ponens.
This is a book to be savored, meditated upon. I’ve bought it several times and whenever I see it at used book sales, I buy it to give it away. It is that important. Don’t stop here, though. Immediately transition to Kingdom Triangle.
This might sound like a hippie-megachurch title, but it is a good presentation of the findings of neuroscience, culture, and a broader Patristic paradigm.
I spent the past few days on Facebook debating soon-to-be-Socinians in the CBMW on why you shouldn’t tinker with the Trinity. Some friends have asked me for a primer on basic Patristics texts. This is more or less an impossible request but I can start to lay the groundwork. If you devote at least a good six months to working through these issues, you will begin to see why tinkering with the Trinity must end badly.
Hilary of Poitiers, “De Synodis.” St Hilary explains how the early Fathers had to break the back of certain categories before they became acceptable.
Athanasius. Contra Arianos. This work is very difficult to read but it is his best work.
Gregory of Nazianzus. On God and Christ: Five Theological Orations. The best thing ever written on Trinitarianism.
Gregory of Nyssa. “Great Catechism” and “On Not Three Gods.” Advances the argument that the Trinity is one mind, will, power, and energy of operation. This is why Gospel Coalition types won’t engage me when I ask them how many minds are in the Trinity.
Basil. On The Holy Spirit.
Pseudo-Dionysius. The Divine Names.
Letham, Robert. The Holy Trinity. Letham has a number of blind-spots but he covers the material better than any.
Lacugna, Catherine. God for Us. She is a liberal Jesuit and that comes out in her writing, but she does a fine job on the Cappadocians.
Torrance, Thomas. The Trinitarian Faith and One Being: Three persons. The two best texts by a modern on the Trinity. Torrance has few equals. And no, his so-called “neo-orthodoxy” does not come out in this.
McGuckin, John. Saint Cyril of Alexandria and the Christological Controversy. Excellent survey of Cyril’s thought and he makes the argument that Chalcedon, far from being a Western council, specifically made Cyril the standard for Christology.
———–. St Gregory of Nazianzus: An Intellectual Biography. Just fun.
Beeley, Christopher. The Unity of Christ and In Your Light We See Light.
Barnes, Michel. The Power of God. Explores Gregory of Nyssa’s use of “dynamis” in Christology.
Farrell, Joseph. God, History, and Dialectic. Be careful but some good analysis.
Photios. Mystagogy of the Holy Spirit. Perhaps the Filioque can be salvaged, but not by positing the Father-Son as a single cause.
Jenson, Robert. Systematic Theology, vol. 1.
Perl, Eric. Theophany: Dionysius’s Philosophy.
Gould and Davis (eds). Loving God with Your Mind: Essays in Honor of JP Moreland. Some outstanding essays on what it means for universals to be exemplified.
Maximus the Confessor. The Cosmic Mystery of Jesus Christ.
Moreland, J. P. Universals.
Cooper, John. Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting.
Morris, Thomas. The Logic of God Incarnate. This is tough and I am not sure I agree with all of his conclusions, but it is an important study nonetheless.
Plantinga, Alvin. Does God have a Nature? Yeah, yeah, classical theism and all. Plantinga’s arguments can’t simply be brushed aside.
Nominalism seeks the simplest explanation in ontology. One of their confusions regarding realism, though, is that they think universals have spatial location. But as B. Russell pointed out, the universal “being north of” is not spatial.
The austere nominalist is committed to just one ontological category, particulars. Austere nominalism runs into problems when it gets to the category of abstract particulars, such as “courage is a virtue.”
Not universals; just linguistic expressions about nonlinguistic objects. One of the difficulties, though, is it is forced to rely on type/token distinctions, which start to look like universals. It’s not hard to see connections with postmodernism.
By far the most interesting. Concrete particulars have colors, etc., but those attributes are just particulars. So, if two objects have the color “red,” does that mean they share the universal “redness”? Not necessarily. Rather, they have the set of resembling trope red. But isn’t a set a universal? Not exactly. Sets have clear-cut identity conditions. Universals do not. Sets are identical just in case all members are identical. Set, α, is identical with set ,β , when the members of each set are identical with one another.
So this appears to give the trope nominalist an edge over the realist, except for one problem. Take the referents
“Being a unicorn”
“Being a griffin.”
Since there are no such things as unicorns or griffins, they must belong to the set, null. As Loux points out, “given the identity conditions for sets, there is just one null set,” which would mean both propositions are in fact identical. But this is clearly false (91-92), as any schoolchild knows.
Other problems with trope nominalism (cf Moreland):
- membership in a set of tropes is arbitrary (Moreland doesn’t expound)
- Two red balls (A and B) resemble each other because they have red₁ and red₂ constituents.
- The copula “is” in question is neither of predication or identity, but set membership.
- Rejoinder: why red and not green? Red tropes resemble each other in a different way than green tropes? Why?
- If two tropes, Red and Sweet, are in the same location, how are they not identical on the Trope Nominalist view.