From his Man: The Image of God
On the broader/narrower distinction: man, despite his fall, was not beastialized (38). By narrower man lost his communion with God.
- the broader sense reminds us of what was not lost in the fall.
- Perhaps better to speak of a duality between Old and New.
Should image of God be read as “active” (conformitas) or ontic (essence)?
Berkouwer on Eastern Orthodoxy
- He doesn’t give the best discussion of EO, either in what they believe or in how to critique it. Though he does hint that EO thinkers aren’t always able to clearly state the connection between inheriting Adam’s curse of death and why we always do sinful things, but yet refusing to call it Original Sin.
Schilder sees man’s creation as the pre-condition for the image, but not the image itself (Berkouwer 54). The actual image lies in the officium created man receives (I don’t think this is the full picture, but there is some truth to this, especially if we connect the imago dei with man’s dominion, as the Westminster Shorter Catechism hints at).
- Thus, the image is dynamic and is rooted in the Covenantal God’s Relation with man.
- the word “image” implies “making visible.”
- Schilder resists any abstracting the image.
- The glory of the image shines forth in service to God (56).
The danger with Schilder’s approach is that it makes the image too “dynamic” with an emphasis on conformitas.
What is the relationship between man’s humanness and God’s Image? Berkouwer wants to deny that fallen man images God (57). He says he can do this without rejecting what it means for man to be man.
- Passages like Genesis 9:6 are not proof-texts for some abstract view of the image analogia entis. They deal with a humanness in the context of God’s plan of salvation.
- The truth of the matter is Scripture doesn’t focus that much on the distinction between wider and narrow, important though it is.
- traditional discussions have always focused on image as defined by person, will, reason, and freedom. Scripture, on the other hand, is concerned with man-in-relation-to-God.
- A synthesis between the ontic and active aspects of the image is impossible when using concepts like “nature” and “essence” (61).
- The danger in abstracting the imago dei is that the body is usually not included in what it means to be God’s image. This means that only part of man is creted in the image of God.
- Such discussions lose focus of the humanness of man. They forget that man is man-in-his-apostasy.
The Meaning of the Image
Origen expounded the view that man was created in God’s image but grows into God’s likeness (De Principiis, 3.4.1; Bavinck calls this the naturalistic view).
Calvin, on the other hand, sees the two terms as an example of Hebrew parallelism. Berkouwer gives the best critique: “And if God’s plan for man (that man should have both image and likeness) was only partially realized by man’s creation in his Image (As Origen and others claimed), then it is difficult to explain Genesis 5, which speaks of man’s creation in God’s likeness (demuth) and after his image, tselem (Berkouwer, 69).
The image-concept and the Second Commandment
2Comm. deals with a prohibition against arbitrariness which man tries to have God at his beck and call (79). The 2C is not primarily trying to protect the “spirituality” of God but to show that God is not at man’s beck and call (though, of course, God is spiritual).
The creation of man is directly related to the prohibition of images: “For in worshiping images, man completely misunderstands God’s intentions and no longer realizes the meaning of his humanity (84).
Biblical usage: The NT speaks of humanity as whether it is the “New man in Christ” or not. To the degree it speaks of conformitas, it speaks of the new conformitas in Christ.
While the analogia entis is certainly wrong, we need to be careful of speaking of an analogia relationis, pace Barth and Dooyeweerd. Berkouwer wisely notes that Scripture doesn’t speak of a “relation” in the abstract, but of a “relation as it becomes visible in the salvation of Christ” (101).
Even if one were to speak of an analogia entis, the biblical presentation of “being like God” has nothing to do with the natural state of affairs but rather shows forth the wonder of the new birth (1 John 3:9). The “imitation of God” forms the pendant of our witness to the world, in which word and deed are joined in an unbreakable unity (102).
The Corruption of the Image
How do we reconcile language of corruption with hints of “remnants?” There is a difficulty in saying that sin is “accidental” to man. It cannot mean that sin is merely peripheral to man’s existence. Rather, it affects all that he does. The Formula of Concord says that sin is an accident, but one that produces man’s spiritual death (133). When Flacius Illyrius saw the term “accident,” he interpreted it as meaning that sin is relative and external.
The problem is that substance/accidents language cannot do justice to the NT reality of sin. Berkouwer suggests we can rise above the dilemma “only when we see man’s nature, his being man, in his inescapable relation to God” (135).
We also need to be aware of positing “any remnant in man which can escape divine indictment” (135). Whatever else we may think of substance/accidents, “Scripture constantly makes it clear that sin is not something which corrupts relatively or partially, but a corruption which full affects the radix, the root, of man’s existence, and therefore man himself” (104-141).
- Gen. 6:11-12; the sin is referred to as “great.”
- Gen. 6:5; man’s heart is evil
- Gen. 8.21 (man’s imagination is evil from his youth)
- Life outside of Christ is pictured as “under God’s wrath” (
“The power of sin since the fall is like an avalanche, and it results in the intervening judgment of God” (141). The Old testament gives us a picture of total corruption but a limited curse (God doesn’t wipe us out completely).
“The jubilation of salvation corresponds to the real condition of lostness” (144).
Humanness and Corruption
Discussion about common grace. When Calvin says man has “no worth” he means no merit before God’s judgment.
The Whole Man
Scripture doesn’t talk about man in the abstract, but man in his relation to God (195).
Biblical use of the word “soul.”
Sometimes it is “nefesh,” meaning life and can refer to man himself. Berkouwer rejects that “soul” is a “localized religious part of man” (201). The Bible’s interchangeable usage between soul and life should draw attention to the fact that the “heart” is of primary importance: “The heart shows forth the deeper aspect of the whole humanness of man, not some functional localization in a part of man which would be the most important part” (202-203).
Concerning anthropological dualisms
Such a view sees the soul as the “higher” part, closer to God. Leads to ascetism. However, evil in the bible is never localized in a part of man.
Bavinck attacks trichotomy because Scripture knows of no original dualism between spirit and matter (209). The trichotomist sees the soul as mediating between body and spirit (find Damascene’s comment that the soul is higher point, cf Bruce McCormack, Engaging the Doctrine of God).
Dualism and duality are not identical (211). We can speak of a duality in God’s creation man and woman, without positing an ontological dualism between them (this is where Maximus and Jakob Boehme err). “Duality within created reality does not exclude harmony and unity, but is exactly oriented towards it” (211).
Does soul and body involve a tension, and if so that would make it a dualism? If it does involve a tension, we must reject not only trichotomy, but dichotomy.
Per the confessions and creeds, “there is a great difference between non-scientific references to a dual aspect of human nature and a thesis that man is composed of two substances, body and soul” (213-214).
It opposes the idea that all the rich variation of humanness can be forced into two substantial categories.
Stoker defines substance as the “systatic core of man, that which functions in all spheres” (H.G. Stoker, Die nuwere Wijsbegeerte aan die Vrije Universiteit, 1933, 40ff.).
For the Dooyeweerdian critique, matter can never be an independent counter-pole to form.
Immortality of the Soul
Genuine and real life in Scripture is life in communion with God. The philosophical notion of “immortality of the soul” calls death a lie and misunderstands the judgment of God (250).
The main contention of Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd whether there was a natural immortality based on an essence abstracted from its relation to God, from which we can draw further conclusions, such as the soul’s “indestructibility” (249).
Per Van der Leuw, there is no continued existence of the soul as such after death, “but a continuation of the contact point by God even though death” (Onsterfelijkheid of Opstanding, 25 quoted in Berkouwer 252).
- The problem of what happens when we die does not involve a purely spiritual salvation but can only be answered in the context of death and the Day of Judgment (Althaus).
Is immortality of the soul correlative with the substantial dualism of mind-body? This dichotomy raises substantial (pun?) problems and questions (255):
- When the “soul” is separated from the body, what activities is it still able to carry out?
- If the body is the organ of the soul (as in Aquinas), and the soul needs the body to carry out its functions, how can the soul know or do anything after death?
- Dooyeweerd notes that the psychic functions are indissolubly connected with the total temporal-cosmic relationship of all modal functions and cannot be abstracted from this relationship.
- Thus, we have a “living soul” which does not live.
- Rather, with Dooyeweerd we should speak of a duality which is supra-temporal in the religious center of man (heart) and the whole temporal-functional complex.
- Dooyeweerd does say that the soul continues as a form of existence with an individuality structure (Berkouwer 257n. 33).
Does Dooyeweerd’s school give us a “psychology without a soul?”
- No, for Dooyeweerd says we cannot view man’s essence “in itself” and then tack it onto a relation with God.
The Reformed confessions’ use of soul and body is not to give a systematic anthropology but to show that expectation of salvation surpasses death (271).
Creationism and Traducianism
Berkouwer sees the problems with Creationism:
- it finds the soul’s origin in another dimension than the “other” part of man, which finds its origin…from its parents (294).
Freedom in the New Testament is not a “possibility,” but an actuality, the actuality of being free (Gal. 3:13, 4:4). Defining freedom as “double possibility,” as freedom of choice, arises from an abstract and irreligious and neutral anthropological analysis of human freedom (334).
irony and tension: if freedom is defined as choice, then we see that the choice for sin becomes a manifestation of human freedom–though we (and the Bible!) then go on to speak of sin as actually being slavery (335)!
Choosing Ba’al is not an ontological freedom of the will, but an endangering of freedom and the acceptance of an enslaved will (Deut. 30:18). How can we speak of a neutral and autonomous freedom of will when Jesus commands us to accept his yoke and his burden? (348)
Man of God
In the Old Testament it refers to a relationship with God (349). Such a term can never be one of an abstract and neutral man. It is man drawn out of darkness and into light.
“The magnalia Dei does not exclude true greatness, but calls it forth” (352). [Think Stonewall Jackson]